This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the relationship between austerity measures and economic growth. We propose a general equilibrium model where (i ) agents have recursive preferences; (ii ) economic growth is endogenously driven by investments in R&D; (iii ) the government is committed to a zero-deficit policy and finances public expenditures by means of a combination of labor taxes and R&D taxes. We find that austerity measures that rely on reducing resources available to the R&D sector depress economic growth both in the short-and long-run. High debt EU members are currently implementing austerity measures based on higher taxes and/or lower investments in the R&D sector. This casts some doubts on the real ability of these countries to grow over the next years.
Introduction
The severity of the recent European sovereign debt crisis has induced European Union (EU) members to sign a new treaty, namely "Fiscal Compact", with the purpose of strengthening countries' creditworthiness, previously established in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
1 The aim of the SGP was to steer the fiscal discipline of each EU member according to the following deficit and debt criteria (medium-term budgetary objective):
(i ) annual deficit below the ratio of 3% of the GDP and (ii ) total public debt below 60% of the GDP, or else sufficiently decreasing towards the 60% each year. However, the absence of enforcement mechanisms in the SGP has not led to fiscal compliance of the member states of the EMU to the SGP debt and deficit targets. Accordingly, European policymakers have put forward that such a failure of the SGP budget criteria across EU countries has been one of the reasons of the spread of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro-zone.
2
With the specific purpose to reduce the macroeconomic imbalances, EU countries have tied themselves with a more rigorous "balanced budget rule" by introducing "automatic mechanism to take corrective actions" if significant deviations from the medium-term objectives are observed. 3 The new fiscal discipline adopted in the Fiscal Compact, 4 which reaffirms the budget criteria fixed in the SGP, establishes also for each member state a limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP at market prices and the obligation to incorporate the new budget rule (also know as "golden rule") in the domestic legal system by means of a constitutional law or an ordinary law.
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On the one side, the spirit of the Fiscal Compact and in general of the European austerity policy reflects the idea that EU countries have to transfer fiscal sovereignty to supranational institutions as a cost to safeguard the Euro Area economic and financial stability. On the other side, it is not clear whether the adopted fiscal measures represent a right response to the crisis, or if instead they had adverse effects on the economic recovery.
The ongoing debate on austerity measures and growth remains controversial. Some policymakers and economists argue that the observed effort to reduce fiscal deficits in high-debt levels European countries would stimulate the economy in the short run as well as promote long-run growth (see for instance Alesina and Ardagna (2009) , or the dispute on Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) ). Others argue that austerity measures will reduce output in both the short-run and the long-run (Romer and Romer (2010) ) as well as increase poverty and income inequality (Ball, Furceri, Leigh, and Loungani (2013); Schaltegger and Weder (2014) ; Woo, Bova, Kinda, and Zhang (2013) ). The general idea is that adverse effects of fiscal consolidations take place because simultaneous public spending cuts and tax increases tend to leave no room for both public and private investments in physical capital and new technologies.
Both fiscal consolidation and economic policy uncertainty are still at the top of the policy agenda, especially across European authorities. However, there is a relatively high degree of heterogeneity in the level of fiscal stabilization urgency across countries showing different debt structures. High-debt/deficit European economies seem to suffer from such a strict fiscal consolidation long-term plan. In particular, countries showing relatively high debt-and deficit-to-GDP ratios and high labor income tax ratios seem to be forced to adjust fiscal balances trough cuts on government expenditure or "exotic taxes" (see, for instance, IMF Fiscal Monitor 2013) . In this scenario, countries might be forced to impose also spending cuts (or special taxes) in highly productive sectors, such as R&D. This might affect private investments in R&D as well (Westmore (2013) ). Consequently, the probability of developing a new good embodying a technology with long-lasting positive welfare effects decreases.
Even if the idea of a fiscal consolidation should be anchored in credible medium term plans, and thus it is too early to draw conclusions, post-Lehman data tell us that austerity measures in these countries are far from promoting economic growth. Can European fiscal authorities tax more fairly? The answer seems to be in the affirmative. However, when countries face high debt/deficit, they already display relatively high corporate and labor income taxes and are less competitive in terms of good prices, a tightening policy may come at the cost of current and expected economic growth.
To study the effects of "adverse fiscal policies", we present a standard production economy model in which (i) growth is endogenously driven by patents accumulation (as in Romer (1990) ; Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) ; Kung and Schmid (2014) ); (ii) agents have recursive preferences (as in Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) and Kung and Schmid (2014) ); and (iii) a regime of fiscal consolidation is exogenously imposed (e.g. R&D taxes). To be consistent with the new European fiscal discipline, we assume that public expenditure is hinged on a zero-deficit target and is financed only by taxes, both on labor income and R&D investments. 6 Letting fiscal authorities combine different tax sources captures the idea that, although the budget targets are fixed and publicly observed, future fiscal policies might remain uncertain. We introduce policy uncertainty by means of a fiscal volatility shock on public expenditure, 7 which in turn determines uncertainty on R&D expenditure. Upon the realization of a fiscal volatility shock, imbalances on output, output growth, and other macroeconomic aggregates take place. In this setup, we study the impact on such variables in the case of both (i ) a deterministic R&D tax rate chosen by an ex-ante fiscal policy and (ii ) a stochastic R&D tax rate, positively correlated to fiscal expenditures.
Our analysis shows that uncertainty on future government expenditure undermines households confidence. In response to higher fiscal uncertainty, households -which are averse to both consumption and utility risk in our model -increase current labor supply at the expense of consumption. Such a drop of consumption, in turn, triggers a contraction of output and R&D investments. To face this scenario the government, due to the zerodeficit target, may be induced to increase taxation on the R&D sector. We find that an increase in the R&D tax rate induces a significantly worse contraction in the main macroeconomic variables including expected output growth and expected consumption 6 In our setting, only labor income taxes are endogenously determined. Therefore, both government expenditure and innovation sector taxes are exogenous.
7 See for instance Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012).
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growth. Moreover, we also observe that in the presence of a stochastic R&D tax ratepositively correlated to fiscal expenditures -the expected R&D growth decreases as well.
Here, uncertainty is simultaneously transmitted through both public expenditure and the R&D tax rate, and households anticipate government's actions by allocating capital in risk-free assets (i.e. increase savings). This mechanism increases the return on equity and decreases the risk free rate as compared to an economy with deterministic tax rates.
This mechanism implies that fiscal uncertainty commands a premium, of about 2%, over deterministic tax rates.
Our findings suggest that fiscal policy uncertainty plays a key role in economic consolidation. In particular, if uncertainty undermines household confidence in the expected fiscal investment stimulus (R&D sector), a positive expenditure shock shrinks future consumption and growth rate more than it would happen in absence of co-movements between fiscal volatility and policy on innovations.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides some recent empirical evidence on fiscal consolidation. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 reports the quantitative results.
Section 5 concludes.
Motivating facts
We present some empirical evidence that supports our contention that an unusual set of fiscal policy actions (i.e. fiscal volatility shock plus strong fiscal consolidation) may be an important component for the current European economic slowdown, and in particular, for the low economic performance of Mediterranean countries (i.e. P IGS), as well as for expected European economic growth. First, we report evidence on the presence of an unprecedented fiscal policy scenario (see also (Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez, 2012) ). Second, we examine the austerity-growth relationship in an ex-post (i.e. 2009-2013) and ex-ante (2014-2018) framework. Last, we compare changes in the total amount of government spending in R&D and gross domestic expenditure in R&D with real economic growth in European countries over the last five years, a period including the Lehman Chapter 11 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
I. An unprecedented fiscal policy scenario Figure 1 (GERMANY) and 0.07 (GERMANY(+), on an annual basis)). This provides evidence for the presence of high-debt/deficit level countries' commitment to reduce fiscal deficit (i.e. austerity), as required by the fiscal compact.
II. Austerity vs. Growth
Is austerity good for economic growth? Does it represent the best remedy? According to ex-post IMF data austerity did not actually work. This is clear from Figure 2 reduce fiscal deficit (as required by the fiscal compact) also display relatively low real output growth. For example, Greece that reduced its fiscal deficit (as share of GDP) by 3 percentage point displays an average real GDP growth of (roughly) -5%. Similarly, Spain and Portugal (two highly indebted countries) reduced their deficit by more than 1 percentage point, and ended up with output growth of -2%. Overall, our simple analysis suggests that austerity is not a good remedy for all those countries with high debt levels.
We confirm the evidence in Figure 2 using a simple regression analysis, where countries' real GDP growth is regressed over austerity (A). As in Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Slok (2002) , in order to have one observation per country (i.e. pure cross-sectional analysis) data are averaged over the period [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . Results are reported in Table 1 , and provide strong support for our argument that austerity is a significant causal factor in the amplification of the EU sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, as informally suggested by Figure   2 , austerity negatively affects economic growth. As a robustness check, we interact our austerity measure with the sovereign credit rating of the economy in 2013 (CR), to capture the idea that austerity is likely to affect more countries with lower creditworthiness (i.e. countries facing serious public finance issues). Based on the S&P sovereign foreign currency credit rating in 2013, we convert the credit rating to a numerical scale, where a value of 0 corresponds to a AAA rating, 1 to a AA+ rating, and so on, down to 15 for a B rating, the lowest in our sample (see also Devereux and Yetman (2010) ).
9 We obtain similar statistics, i.e., our measure of austerity is statistically significant. In addition, the relatively high adjusted R 2 is supportive of austerity, playing an important role in explaining the European economic downturn. In summary, this evidence suggests that an austerity approach is important for the amplification of the negative economic shocks.
The birth of this fiscal policy strategy is due to the over-indebted and unstable nature of sovereign debts, which increases interest rates and inhibit growth. Supportive examples are austerity programs implemented by the IMF in emerging markets and Germany's post-Berlin Wall adjustment. The hope is that high-debt level countries can contain their excessive spending enough to restore credibility. In doing so, they will bring down in- terest rates and promote economic growth. Based on this premise, the IMF estimates that such austerity will bring all European countries to positive real economic growth.
This is clear from Figure 3 , which plots the average reduction in fiscal deficit against the real GDP growth over the period 2014-2018 (Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor). Based on these estimates, no country will display negative economic growth. For example, Greece is expected to growth (in real terms) by more than 2.5% (on average). While IMF estimates might proxy existing empirical evidence (Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) , Alesina and Perotti (1995) , Alesina and Perotti (1996) , among others) suggesting that large fiscal deficit cuts might be followed by an increase in private consumption, empirical evidence from the post-Lehman world tells us another story (see also Krugman (2013)). For example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) show that in Denmark (1983-196) and Ireland (1987 Ireland ( -1989 ) the fiscal deficit fell by 9.5 and 7.2 percent of GDP, respectively, and private consumption increased (cumulatively) by 17.7% and 14.5% . Alesina and Perotti (1996) identify similar episodes in Belgium (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) , Italy (1989 Italy ( -1992 , Portugal (1984 Portugal ( -1986 and Sweden (1983 Sweden ( -1989 . However, Perotti (1999) observes that fiscal policy shocks might have both positive and negative effects on private consumption. The author shows that this is related to the state of the economy (i.e. good vs. bad times). This time it is different. On top of a negative average real GDP growth, several European countries, as a result of the strong fiscal consolidation, also display a negative private consumption growth rate. For example, the PIGS private consumption growth rate over the period 2009-2012 is equal to -2.87%. This has clearly affected the EU private consumption which displays also a negative growth rate (i.e. -0.32%).
III. R&D vs. Growth
As a consequence of tightening fiscal measures, weaker European countries largely cut R&D expenditure along with all the other public expenses. As of 2011, Italy, Portugal and Spain, decreased the percentage of output devoted to R&D by -1.03%, -6.02% and -4.09%, respectively (source: World Economic Indicators). However, let us remind ourselves that R&D investments as well innovation specific policies (e.g. R&D tax incentives, direct government support to innovation, patent rights) are fundamental in driving both shortand long-run economic growth, as suggested by both theoretical and empirical studies (Aghion and Howitt (1992) ; Griffith (2000) ; Westmore (2013) ). Can a drastic cut in R&D be beneficial? Apparently not. 
A framework to assess the impact of austerity
Our theoretical framework builds on Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) who employ a production economy in which (i) agents have recursive preferences, and (ii) growth is determined by patent accumulation (as in Romer (1990) ) to study the effects of different fiscal policy schemes on the composition of intertemporal consumption risk. However, we consider several departures from their theoretical setup.
10 First, we account for stochastic volatility (i.e. fiscal volatility shocks). This is in line with recent empirical and theoretical work aimed at examining the impact of fiscal, technology and monetary volatility shocks on macroeconomic and financial aggregates (Bloom (2009) ; Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012)), as well as consistent with postLehman empirical evidence (Bloom (2009) ; (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2013) ). 11 Second, our government is committed to a unique fiscal strategy. Specifically, we focus exclusively on a zero-deficit target policy (consistently with the rules imposed by the fiscal compact and recently signed by EU members). Third, we introduce "ad hoc" austerity measures by means of taxation on R&D expenditure, and for robustness purposes, on R&D profits.
It turns out that our government can use both taxes on labor income and R&D (or R&D profits) to finance public expenditures. We first assume a fixed R&D tax, and then, turn our attention to a one following an exogenous stochastic process. Last, for parsimony purposes, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas consumption-leisure aggregator.
Households
The representative agent has recursive preferences a là Epstein and Zin (1989) ,
where γ measures relative risk aversion (RRA), ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), and β ∈ (0, 1) is the household's subjective discount factor. A standard expected utility model is nested under the assumption γ = 1 ψ . The utility flow,
, is a Cobb-Douglas index of aggregate consumption, C t , and leisure, 1−L t , given by
where α c ∈ (0, 1) reflects preferences for consumption versus leisure. In line with the longrun risk literature, we assume γ ≥ 1 ψ , that is, the agent is averse to both consumption and volatility risk. In other words, our agent dislikes uncertainty on future utility levels. Notice that this preference specification allows to separate the RRA parameter from the IES, and has been widely used in recent asset pricing and RBC/IBC studies (Benigno, Benigno, and Nisticó (2011); Papanikolaou (2011); Caldara, Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramírez, and Yao (2012) ; Colacito and Croce (2013); Pancrazi (2013) ; Kung and Schmid (2014) ).
Notice also that this class of preference has been recently supported by experimental studies (Brown and Kim (2013) ).
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In each period, our representative agent chooses consumption C t and labor L t to maximize (1) subject to the following budget constraint
where Q t denotes equity shares, Υ t is the market value of an equity share, D t represents aggregate dividends, B t denotes public debt holdings, and R f t is the risk-free rate. The representative agent chooses consumption, labor, equity shares and debt holdings, and his wages W t are taxed at a rate τ l t . The stochastic discount factor for this economy can be written as follows
The first order conditions of the maximization problem give rise to the following standard asset pricing conditions:
Finally, the agent's optimal labor condition takes the following form
Production

I. Final Good Production
As in Kung and Schmid (2014) , the final consumption good (i.e. final output), Y t , is produced in a competitive sector using a bundle of intermediate goods, Z i,t , and labor,
where α is the intermediate goods bundle share, A t represents the number of intermediate goods at time t, and Λ t is an exogenous stochastic (stationary) productivity process
The final good firm chooses labor and intermediate goods to maximize profits. Formally,
where P i,t represents the price of the intermediate good i at time t. The maximization implies the following
II. Intermediate Good Production
Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic firms, i.e, firm i produces good i. In order to produce Z i,t units of the intermediate good i, each firm needs Z i,t units of the final good. The intermediate producer takes the demand schedule Z i,t obtained in (7) as given, and chooses P i,t to maximize the following objective function (profit):
Replacing (7) in (8) we find that monopolistic firms charge a markup α by choosing the optimal price
Since firms are identical, by solving the profit maximization problem, a generic firm i produces Z t ≡ Z i,t units of good i given by
and makes a profit of
Finally, replacing (9) in (6) we have
This expression shows that the final output depends on the variety of the intermediate goods, A t .
Government
In line with Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013), we assume that government expenditure is driven by an exogenous stochastic process. In addition, in the spirit of Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012), we account for fiscal volatility shocks. Formally, G t evolves as follows
(11)
whereḡ andν are the long-run averages of the government expenditure-output ratio and government expenditure volatility, respectively. ρ g and ρ ν are persistence parameters.
In order to capture austerity measures that rely on R&D cuts (consistently with recent empirical evidences, see Figure 4 ), we assume that the government finances total public spending by means of public debt, labor and R&D taxes,
the total amount of investment in R&D, and
The economic intuition for this fiscal rule is the following: the government has a desired fiscal rule for the R&D sector given by (1 − ρ χ )χ + ρ χ χ t−1 . The shock χ captures unexpected changes in economic or legislative conditions that force the government to deviate from the desired rule. For instance, the request from an external authority to curb and reduce public debt.
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The government faces the following budget constraint
Differently from Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013), we focus exclusively on a tax regime where the government is committed to set G t − T t = 0 (consistent with rules imposed by the European SGP).
R&D
In the spirit of Kung and Schmid (2014) produce new patents and sell them to make profits. In this setup, the value of existing variety, V t , is as follows
where δ v represents the depreciation rate of the new technology. The market value of a new patent must then be equal to the cost of producing a new patent corrected for R&D taxation (i.e., free-entry condition):
where 1 Θ t is the cost of developing a new patent. Following Kung and Schmid (2014) , the stock of patents in this economy evolves as follows
14 See also Santacreu (2012) .
Hence the growth rate of newly produced technology is
Notice that Θ t represents the productivity of the innovation sector and, as in Comin and Gertler (2006) , is defined as follows:
, where η ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of new patents with respect to total R&D investment.
Resource constraint
Finally, we close our economy with the following market clearing conditions:
in the final good production, and
in the labor market.
Quantitative analysis
In this section we calibrate our model and explore the implications of fiscal policy for long-and short-run dynamics of macroeconomic variables. As a first exercise, we set taxes on R&D to zero and re-examine the impact of fiscal volatility shocks. Then, we impose different levels of constant R&D taxes and study their effects on macroeconomic aggregates in presence of both TFP and fiscal volatility shocks. Finally, we calibrate our full model with stochastic fiscal policy (i.e. both government expenditure and R&D taxes are stochastic) and explore its implications for short-and long-run economic growth.
Calibration
The model presented in this paper involves 21 parameters: three for preferences, eight refering to the technology (final good production) and R&D (new patents development), and ten for government policies and taxes. Notice that our benchmark calibration relies on a zero-deficit policy commitment. All parameter values are reported in Table 2 . Preferences' parameters (i.e. subjective discount factor, β, RRA, γ, and IES, ψ) are in line with the long-run risk literature which imposes γ > 1 ψ (i.e. agents are risk averse in future utility as well as future consumption). In particular, we set γ = 10 (Kung and Schmid (2014)) and ψ = 1.7 (Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) ).
Since the main focus of the paper is on the implications of EU cross-country adverse fiscal policies on current and expected economic growth, the scale parameter ξ is chosen to match the average output growth rate in the Euro Area over the last two decades (around 1.5%). The technology parameters α (i.e. relative share of labor in the final good production) and η (i.e. elasticity of new intermediate goods) are set as in Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) . Moreover, we set the technology shock volatility σ Λ = 0.005 to be below the value used in Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) who employ σ Λ = 0.006. As in Kung and Schmid (2014) , we set the patent obsolescence rate, ρ v , equal to 0.0375.
Turning to government and taxes parameters, the constantḡ captures the average logarithmic level of the government expenditure output ratio. To be more consistent with EU data, we setḡ = −2.0373, which implies a government expenditure-GDP ratio of 13%.
This value is slightly higher than that employed by Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) , who set G/Y = 11%. The persistence parameters of the government expenditure-output ratio and government expenditure volatility, ρ g and ρ ν , are taken from Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2013) and Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and RubioRamírez (2012), respectively. The volatility of the government expenditure shock, σ g , is equal to 0.5 · σ Λ as well as to the volatility of the R&D tax shock, σ χ . In addition, we assume that ε g t and ε χ t are positively correlated and impose corr(ε g , ε χ ) = 0.3. We employ this positive correlation to capture the fact that in order to finance higher expenditures, governments likely increase taxes (in this case, R&D taxes).
Our calibration implies a steady state R&D tax rate, τ r t , equal to 11.92%. In addition,
we impose a steady state labor income tax rate equal to 36.5% (in line with EU average labor market data). The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency and solved using third-order perturbation methods. 
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Re-examining the effect of fiscal volatility shocks
In this section, we examine the implications of the model in presence of an increase in the volatility of government expenditures. More precisely, we study the effect of a positive shock when the R&D tax rate is set to 0. This naturally implies that there is no correlation between fiscal expenditure and R&D taxes, i.e., corr( g , χ ) = 0. According to equation (11)- (13) and the zero-deficit rule, a positive shock to volatility of government expenditures generates higher than usual uncertainty about the future fiscal policy. Figure 5 depicts the impulse responses of macroeconomic aggregates to a fiscal volatility shock. The shock generates a moderate but persistent contraction in the future growth rate of the economy (i.e., the expected growth rate of consumption, output, labor supply and R&D expenditures drop immediately and return to their initial level more than 20 quarters after the shock, see Panels B, D, F and H). 16 The current value of new patents increases (see Panel I). The higher uncertainty concerning future fiscal rules decreases the value the households' continuation utility. Because of agents being averse to both consumption and utility risk (i.e. ψ > 1), the continuation utility and consumption are substitutes. As a result, households respond to the higher uncertainty by working more today and decreasing current consumption (see Panels A and E). The increase in the labor supply also increases the amount of current labor taxes and the aggregate output which, in turn, boosts expected corporate profits (see Panels C and J). The increase in corporate profits incentives innovations and augments current R&D expenditures (see Panel G).
Note that our policies slightly differ from those of Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) where a fiscal uncertainty shock decreases current labor supply. The difference is explained by the utility function: households in our paper are equipped with Epstein and Zin recursive utility whereas in Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) the agents have standard separable consumption-labor power utility with habit formation in consumption. In our setup, the substitution effect generated by Epstein and Zin preferences implies that, households, which are averse to utility risk, increase labor today. This comes at the cost of lower expected labor growth. and total amount of labor taxes τ l W t L t with respect to a shock to the volatility of government expenditures ν t (ε ν t ). To focus exclusively on fiscal volatility shocks, we impose corr( g , χ ) = 0 and τ r ≡ 0 and the scale parameter is adjusted to be ξ = 0.6054. All the remaining parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Table 2 
Deterministic R&D taxation: Policy implications
The previous section examines the effect of fiscal volatility shocks in a world where the R&D sector is not taxed. In order to capture the effect of austerity measures that rely on raising R&D taxes we consider now an economy with deterministic R&D tax rates. Figure 6 shows the effect of a fiscal volatility shock for different R&D tax rates. The main result of this experiment is the following: higher taxes on the R&D sector worsen the effect of an increase in the uncertainty surrounding future fiscal rules, and make the subsequent economic contraction not only more severe but also more long-lasting.
R&D taxation also alters the effect of TFP shocks. The impulse response function of a negative TFP shock are presented in Figure 7 . First, we observe that a negative TFP shock creates a more prolonged and severe contraction in economic activity than the fiscal volatility shock. Second, we point out a trade-off between taxes on R&D and taxes on the labor income. Higher taxes on R&D cause a less pronounced drop in macroeconomic variables. The economic mechanism behind this result can be summarized as follows: higher taxes on the R&D sector imply that the government budget constraint can be satisfied with lower taxes on labor income (see Panel J); the decrease in the labor income tax rate stimulates labor supply and reduces the impact of the negative TFP shocks (see Panel E). In summary, R&D taxation has a twofold effect on the dynamics of macroeconomic variables: on the one hand, it amplifies the economic contraction after a negative fiscal volatility shocks; on the other hand it mitigates the negative effects produced by negative TFP shocks on the expected growth rates of consumption, output and R&D expenditures (see Panels B, D and H).
We conclude the analysis of the model with deterministic taxes on the R&D sector by reporting the unconditional moments of the most relevant macroeconomic variables for different values of the tax rate τ r . Table 3 reports that a higher tax rate on the R&D sector depresses the expected growth of output. More precisely, an increase of τ r from 0% to 15% decreases the expected growth rate of aggregate output from 3.83% to 0.53%.
Correspondingly, the risk-free rate decreases from 2.90% to 1.21%. This suggests that, following an increase in the taxation of the R&D sector, capital is reallocated away from 23 the R&D sector and invested in the risk-free asset (i.e. saving increases), thus, decreasing the risk-free rate. This result suggests that, overall, the amplification effect of R&D taxes on fiscal volatility shocks dominates the cushion effect on TFP shocks. We conclude that, in our framework, austerity measures that rely on higher R&D tax rates tend to depress economic growth. patent V t and total amount of labor taxes τ l W t L t with respect to a shock to the volatility of government expenditures ν t ( ν t ). To match the average output growth rate, we adjust the scale parameter and impose ξ = 0.6054. All the other parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Table 2 .
Log deviation from steady state in % Panel A:
Quarters Quarters This figure plots impulse response functions of consumption C t , expected consumption growth patent V t and total amount of labor taxes τ l W t L t with respect to a negative shock to the Solow residual ( Λ t ). To match the average output growth rate, we adjust the scale parameter and impose ξ = 0.6054. All the other parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Table 2 .
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Stochastic R&D taxation
In Figure 8 we consider the complete model with stochastic R&D taxes and analyze the effect of a shock to the stochastic volatility of fiscal expenditures.
The effects are qualitatively the same as in the case of no tax uncertainty. However, the uncertainty surrounding tax rules generates a more severe contraction in the expected growth rate of macroeconomic variables.
In Figure 9 we analyze the effect of a shock to the R&D tax rate in the complete model. Even in this case the shock induces a contraction in economic activity. The trade-off between different sources of taxation is still at work: the higher fiscal revenue from the R&D sector allows for a temporary decrease of revenue coming from labor taxes (see Panel J of Figure 9 ). However, in order to pay back public debt, the government needs to increase future labor taxes which, in turn, depresses future consumption and aggregate output (see Panels B, D and J). In other words, following a positive shock to τ r t , the government is trading off current labor taxes for future labor taxes and this trade off exacerbates the impacts of a cut in the R&D sector and makes it more long-lasting.
The negative effect of this trade off is evident from the comparison of Figure 8 and Figure   9 : At all horizons, the drop in macroeconomic quantities, as output and labor, is more severe and their expected recovery rate lower after a negative shock to τ r t than after a fiscal volatility shock.
Finally, in order to judge the plausibility of the economic mechanism proposed in this paper, we compare the model implied moments with those in the data. From the results reported in Table 4 , we observe that the model matches the expected values of most relevant macroeconomic quantities. In particular, the model produces realistic values for the expected growth rates of output and consumption and the risk-free rate. The equity premium is a bit lower than in the data (2.75% vs 3.95%). A way to increase the equity premium would be to add stochastic volatility on the process for R&D taxes. In our production economy, we do not consider this extra source of uncertainty because we prefer concentrating our analysis on the link between R&D taxation and economic growth.
Admittedly, the absence of this extra source of uncertainty makes the model unable to This figure plots impulse response functions of consumption C t , expected consumption growth Log deviation from steady state in % Panel A:
Quarters Quarters 
Aggregate dividends are defined as in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) . The aggregate risk premium, E[r * a −r f ], is levered following Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) . Macro and asset pricing data are from the OECD and run from 1996 to 2013. Annualized empirical moments are represented by cross-country averages. Our sample includes the following EU countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. R&D expenditure growth in each country, ∆s, is represented by the Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D Compound annual growth rate. Countries' equity returns are computed from "OECD Share Price Indexes". The volatilities have been calculated using this average growth rates and return series. The "OECD EU18 Immediate interest rates, Call Money, Interbank Rate" proxies our risk-free rate. Additional details on the data are given in the Appendix A.
Model Data
First Moments In summary, the main message arising from our quantitative analysis is the following:
Austerity measures that include an increase in the taxation of R&D sector can, at best, provide a temporary increase in labor supply but harm future economic growth. The temporary increase in labor supply comes from the reallocation of resources from the R&D sector to the labor market produced by the higher tax rates in conjunction with the substitution effect of Epstein and Zin preferences. However, the reallocation of capital away from the R&D sector decreases the incentive of firms to innovate and reduces economic growth. Furthermore, we emphasize that in our framework economic growth is only driven by investment in R&D. As a result, any kind of fiscal policy that depresses investment in R&D, as for instance a cut in the government R&D expenditures, also has a negative effect on economic growth. These results may cast some doubts on the effective economic growth of countries with high-debt/deficit levels. A similar statement can be found in Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) . These countries are currently under austerity measures and, according to Figure 4 , also implement substantial cuts in their R&D expenditures, which, of course, decreases private R&D investment. A legitimate question to ask is then the following: Can these countries achieve, in the next years, a stable and positive GDP growth consistent with estimation by the IMF in Figure 3 ?
A robustness check: Taxes on R&D profits
In this section we explore the robustness of our quantitative results. We address whether our results are driven exclusively by the assumption that the government raises revenues by taxing R&D investments directly. To do so, we assume that our government increases revenues by means of taxing R&D profits rather than R&D expenditure. The new equations defining the value of the variety (i.e. value of owning rights to produce a new patent), V t , and government's exogenous tax on profits, τ π t , are described in Appendix (B). Impulse responses to a fiscal volatility shock and to a shock on profits taxes are illustrated in Figures B.1 Moreover, current output and labor now slightly increase and the value of patents slightly decrease following in response to a positive R&D profit tax rate shock (see Panels C, E and I of Figure B .2).
Overall, our results suggest that the adverse effects produced by our fiscal policy scheme, which reduces resources allocated to the sector driving economic growth, are quite general and do not depend on an "ad hoc" R&D taxation.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose a unified general equilibrium framework to study jointly the sharp increase in government expenditures in the aftermath of the Lehman default and the subsequent strengthening in austerity measures following the EU sovereign debt crisis.
Our results suggest that austerity measures based on increasing taxes or spending cuts in the R&D sector seriously harm economic growth. While this result is not surprising in light of the standard economic growth theory, the behavior of fiscal authorities in European countries with relatively high debt/deficit levels (e.g. PIGS) which are currently implementing austerity measures by means of cuts in the R&D sector (i.e. adverse R&D expenditure shocks) might be questioned. In our opinion, this scenario casts doubts on their ability to gain a stable growth path in the next future. To conclude, we are not arguing that austerity measures are bad per sè. Instead, we argue that implementing austerity measures by means of R&D cuts might have sizable adverse effects on current and future economic performance. 
A Data
B Robustness Check -Taxes on Profit
In this setup, the value of existing variety, V t , is as follows
where δ v represents the depreciation rate of the new technology and τ r π takes the following form
3)
The market value of a new patent must then be equal to the cost of producing a new patent (i.e., free-entry condition):
where 1 Θ t is the cost of developing a new patent. Notice that in this scenario our government finances total public spending by means of public debt, labor and capital income taxes,
Parameter values are reported B.1. As an exercise, we set values for the parameters related to taxes on R&D profits equal to R&D taxes parameter values (see Table 2 ).
To match the 1.5% average output growth rate, we impose ξ = 0.6209. Our calibration implies a steady state tax rate on R&D profits equal to 11.92%. As in Section 4.4, we assume that government expenditure and profit taxes shocks are correlated (i.e. corr( g , κ ) > 0). Impulse responses to a fiscal volatility shock and to a shock on profits taxes are reported in Figures B.1 and B.2, respectively. Simulated moments are reported in Table B .2. Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) . The aggregate risk premium, E[r * a −r f ], is levered following Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) . Macro and asset pricing data are from the OECD and run from 1996 to 2013. Annualized empirical moments are represented by cross-country averages. Our sample includes the following EU countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. R&D expenditure growth in each country, ∆s, is represented by the Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D Compound annual growth rate. Countries' equity returns are computed from "OECD Share Price Indexes". The volatilities have been calculated using this average growth rates and return series. The "OECD EU18 Immediate interest rates, Call Money, Interbank Rate" proxies our risk-free rate. Additional details on the data are given in the Appendix A.
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